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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a man is on trial for murder. During opening state-
ments, the defense attorney makes promises to the jury. The attorney
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promises that his client will testify and profess his innocence.1 Accord-
ing to the attorney, the defendant’s truthful testimony will clear up
any ambiguities about the case. The attorney assures the jury that
this testimony will demonstrate his client’s innocence and asks jury
members to preserve their judgments until they hear the defendant
tell his story. Then, after the prosecution presents its case, the defense
attorney has a change of heart. He instructs his client not to testify,
and the client heeds this advice. Members of the jury are now left to
consider the prosecution’s case-in-chief and the defense attorney’s bro-
ken promise.2
Two federal circuits have considered similar situations where a de-
fense attorney reneged on opening statement promises to have a de-
fendant testify.3 Both cases made their way to federal court after
(1) the jury returned a guilty verdict, (2) the defendants exhausted
their state appeals, and (3) the defendants petitioned for habeas re-
lief.4 In Ouber v. Guarino, the First Circuit Court of Appeals found
that an attorney’s decision to renege on such a promise was unreason-
able and ultimately prejudicial to the defendant.5 Thus, for the First
Circuit, such a decision can amount to ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.6 In Bahtuoh v. Smith, however, the Eighth Circuit recently con-
cluded that such a decision was reasonable because it was merely a
shift in strategy.7 Given these two decisions, there is now a circuit
split on the issue of whether an attorney’s decision to not have a de-
fendant testify—after promising the defendant’s testimony in opening
statements—amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his [or her] defense.”8 This “counsel clause”
protects a defendant’s presumption of innocence by enabling that de-
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
2. See Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing the negative
impact on juries when a defense attorney reneges on opening statement promises
to have a defendant testify); John T. “Trey” Cox III & Jason S. Bloom, In Closing:
Strategies for Creating and Arming Jurors in the Closing Argument, 71 TEX. B.J.
266, 267 (2008) (explaining that an unfulfilled promise from opening statements
can taint a lawyer’s credibility); see also Matthew J. O’Connor, Opening State-
ment Restriction Gives Prosecution Head Start, 56 J. MO. B. 100, 100–01 (2000)
(explaining the importance of opening statements and that breaking an opening
statement promise may be noticed by the jury).
3. See Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh III), 855 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2017); Ouber, 293
F.3d at 24.
4. See Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d 868; Ouber, 293 F.3d 19.
5. Ouber, 293 F.3d at 19.
6. See id.
7. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 873.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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fendant to have “ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecu-
tion.”9 Safeguarding this presumption is vital in criminal trials
because an individual’s liberty—or in some instances life—is on the
line.10
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that for the counsel clause to
carry weight, it must be interpreted to mean the right to effective as-
sistance of counsel.11 Courts have not constructed an exact formula
for how to effectively assist a client in every criminal trial.12 Courts
have, rather, sensibly recognized that each case carries its own unique
set of facts, legal principles, and strategic options.13 As such, the stan-
dard for effective assistance is flexible.14 While this flexibility is af-
fording attorneys a great deal of independence, it may also be
justifying a frighteningly low bar for the quality of legal representa-
tion.15 The recent decision of Bahtuoh v. Smith by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals represents one such case that casts doubt on whether
the current standard for effective assistance of counsel truly ensures
fair proceedings for criminal defendants.16 Importantly, this case also
raises the serious question of whether federal courts are relying too
heavily on deferential standards of review.
This Note proceeds in the following parts. Part II provides an over-
view of the relevant cases and statutes leading up to the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Bahtuoh.17 Specifically, section II.A describes the
stringent ineffective assistance of counsel standard set out by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.18 Section II.B explains
the heightened standard that federal courts apply when ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claims appear on petitions for habeas relief.19 Sec-
9. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (citing Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942)).
10. See id. As one scholar notes, “Defendants should be appointed counsel because
without legal expertise, innocent defendants may face unfair proceedings, render-
ing them more vulnerable to wrongful convictions.” Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In
Gideon’s Shadow: The Loss of Defendant Autonomy and the Growing Scope of
Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 363, 367 (2003).
11. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n.14 (1970)).
12. Id. at 688–89.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See Zelnick, supra note 10, at 379 (quoting Steven B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor:
The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE
L.J. 1835, 1858 (1994)).
16. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh III), 855 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2017).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Ouber v. Guarino,
293 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2002).
18. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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tion II.C then explores how the First Circuit Court of Appeals applied
these two standards in Ouber v. Guarino.20
Part III of this Note provides a detailed account of the Bahtuoh
case.21 This Part describes the facts of the original Bahtuoh case at
the state level22 and explains how the case made its way into federal
court.23 Part III then details the analytical process employed by the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota24 and the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals25 in rendering their decisions.
In Part IV, this Note analyzes the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Bah-
tuoh.26 Specifically, this Note questions the way in which the Eighth
Circuit analyzed the state court’s application of the Strickland stan-
dard.27 This Part carefully reviews the state court’s application of
Strickland and explains why the Eighth Circuit should have reached a
different conclusion. At the very least, it exposes missing analytical
pieces from the court’s decision. Part IV illustrates how the Bahtuoh
attorney’s decision to renege on his opening statement promise was
clearly unreasonable—even under the stringent habeas standard.
Rather than carefully analyzing the facts of the case and the state
court’s application of the Strickland standard, however, the Eighth
Circuit overly adhered to the deferential standard of review to reach
its conclusion. Part IV ultimately suggests that the Bahtuoh decision
is a poignant example of the ways in which federal courts may be
shackling themselves by relying too heavily on deferential standards
of review.
Finally, Part IV considers how the Bahtuoh decision may prove
harmful for future criminal defendants in the Eighth Circuit. It ex-
plores the dangers of federal courts relying too heavily on deferential
standards of review when considering ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. It also examines how a regressive assistance of counsel stan-
dard ultimately deprives individuals of the protection guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment. Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Strickland Standard
In Strickland v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the
standard that a defendant must meet in order to prevail on an ineffec-
20. Ouber, 293 F.3d 19.
21. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d 868.
22. State v. Bahtuoh (Bahtuoh I), 840 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. 2013).
23. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh II), No. 14-CV-5009, 2016 WL 2727465 (D. Minn.
Apr. 12, 2016).
24. Id.
25. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 871–74.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 872.
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tive assistance of counsel claim.28 The Strickland Court analyzed
whether a defendant on death row for three murders received effective
assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to (1) obtain a psychiat-
ric evaluation for the defendant and (2) secure character witnesses
prior to the defendant’s sentencing.29 Although the Supreme Court
had previously dealt with Sixth Amendment assistance of counsel is-
sues, it had not clarified the standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel.30 Thus, the Strickland case gave the Court an opportunity to
elaborate on what effective assistance of counsel means.31
In Strickland, the Court explained that “[t]he benchmark for judg-
ing any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”32 To make
such a determination, the Court outlined a two-pronged test.33
The first prong asks whether counsel was “deficient.”34 Specifi-
cally, this prong asks whether counsel’s conduct “fell below an objec-
tive standard of reasonableness.”35 Individuals asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel must overcome a “strong presumption” of reason-
ableness to satisfy this first prong.36 The second prong asks whether
counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant.37 To satisfy this
prong, the defendant must establish a “reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”38
28. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
29. Id. at 676–77. The defendant in Strickland alleged other ineffective assistance of
counsel claims as well, but these claims did not carry much weight for the trial
court, and the Supreme Court did not include them in its conclusory analysis. Id.
at 676, 699–700.
30. Id. at 683. Previously, the Court assessed Sixth Amendment assistance of counsel
issues in the context of an individual being denied counsel and governmental in-
terference with assistance of counsel. Id. (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648 (1984)).
31. Id. at 683, 699–700.
32. Id. at 686.
33. See id. at 687. Although this Note separates and applies these prongs sequen-
tially, the Strickland Court noted that courts may apply the prongs in either or-
der. Id. at 697. Further, if one prong is not satisfied, the court has no obligation to
analyze the attorney’s performance under the other prong. Id.
34. Id. at 687.
35. Id. at 688.
36. Id. at 689 (“[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the de-
fendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the chal-
lenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”) (quoting Michel v.
Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
37. Id. at 687.
38. Id. at 694. Notably, this standard is lower than the preponderance of the evidence
standard used in cases where motions are made for a new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence. Id.
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Recognizing that attorneys must be able to creatively strategize,
however, the Supreme Court warned against establishing an overly
strict standard for reasonable professional conduct.39 There are many
different ways to effectively assist a client and “[t]he availability of
intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed
guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of inef-
fectiveness challenges.” The Court feared that “[i]ntensive scrutiny of
counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could
dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel,
discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust
between attorney and client.”40 Thus, the Court did not identify a for-
mulaic solution for how attorneys must represent their clients in order
to be considered “effective.”41 Rather, the Court clarified that the fun-
damental question in all ineffective assistance of counsel claims is
simply whether the adversarial process was fair.42
B. The AEDPA Standard
After an individual exhausts available remedies in state court, that
individual may pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by
petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus.43 The Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) amended the standard for habeas
corpus claims for individuals in state custody.44 Section 2254(d) ex-
plains that a person in state custody seeking habeas relief from a
judgment in state court will only receive relief in particular situa-
tions.45 Specifically, an individual may only obtain habeas relief if the
proceeding,
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
39. Id. at 696.
40. Id. at 690.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. When an individual has been convicted of a crime and is sentenced to prison, a
writ of habeas corpus is a procedural tool that allows individuals to seek relief in
federal court after exhausting their available remedies in state court. Meredith J.
Duncan, “Lucky” Adnan Syed: Comprehensive Changes to Improve Criminal De-
fense Lawyering and Better Protect Defendants’ Sixth Amendment Rights, 82
BROOK. L. REV. 1651, 1684 (2017). Habeas relief is often used as a means to chal-
lenge the validity of an individual’s conviction on constitutional grounds. Id. at
1683. The standard for habeas relief is stringent because the justice system has
an interest in finality. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Ar-
guably, the need for finality is uniquely important now due to the ever-increasing
number of ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised. See Tom Zimpleman,
The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 S.C. L. REV. 425, 438 (2011) (ex-
plaining that ineffective assistance of counsel claims in habeas petitions have
been the most frequently raised claims in the last thirty years).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
45. See id.
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Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.46
As the statute provides, there are two separate avenues by which an
individual is entitled to habeas relief.47 Under the first, a state court
must be “wrong as a matter of law or unreasonable in its application of
law in a given case.”48 In other words, the writ can be issued if the
state court applies a rule that contradicts “clearly established” Su-
preme Court precedent or if the state court unreasonably applies the
correct Supreme Court rule.49 Under the second, the writ can be is-
sued if the individual establishes that the “court’s presumptively cor-
rect factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.”50
The AEDPA standard was intended to give some degree of defer-
ence to state court determinations.51 But the statute does not require
outright deference to state determinations of federal law.52 Rather,
the statute requires federal courts to carefully consider how the state
court applied federal law.53 If the court believes, after considering the
state court’s determinations, that keeping the petitioner in custody vi-
olates the Constitution, then the state court’s decision will be deemed
unreasonable, and the petitioner may receive habeas relief.54 Further,
the statute requires the federal court to carefully evaluate the eviden-
tiary record.55 If the federal court finds that the state court’s determi-
nations cannot be reasonably supported by the evidentiary record, a
petitioner may receive habeas relief.56
A habeas seeker must satisfy both the Strickland standard and the
deferential AEDPA standard to be entitled to relief for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.57 For purposes of AEDPA, the Strickland
standard is “clearly established Federal law” because it is a clear stan-
dard established by the Supreme Court.58 As such, a habeas seeker
46. Id. (emphasis added); Williams v. Woodford, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1161 (E.D.
Cal. 2012) (“Section 2254(d) operates like a two-lane highway, with each lane
guarded by a tollbooth. To pass through, a petitioner must demonstrate that the
state court adjudication either clashed with federal law (section 2254(d)(1)) or
‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts’ (section 2254(d)(2)).”).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
48. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 385 (2000).
49. Id. at 407.
50. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh III), 855 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Even-
stad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 2006)).
51. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 386.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Taylor, 529 U.S. at 387.
53. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 389.
54. Id.
55. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh II), No. 14-CV-5009, 2016 WL 2727465, at *6 (D.
Minn. Apr. 12, 2016).
56. Id.
57. See Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh III), 855 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2017).
58. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 391.
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must establish either (1) the state court unreasonably applied the
Strickland standard, or (2) the state court’s decision was “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts.”59 While an individual needs
to satisfy only one of the preceding criterion to meet the AEDPA stan-
dard, the requirement of “unreasonable[ness]” makes the AEDPA
standard stringent.60 Even if the federal court finds that the state
court incorrectly applied the Strickland standard, this will not be
enough to meet the AEDPA standard; it must also find unreasonable-
ness.61 For these reasons, individuals seeking habeas relief face an
uphill battle.62
C. The First Circuit’s Application of Strickland and AEDPA:
Ouber v. Guarino
The First Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion to apply both the
Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and the
AEDPA standard for habeas relief in Ouber v. Guarino.63 In Ouber,
the petitioner was charged with trafficking cocaine.64 The charge was
based upon a single transaction that took place between the petitioner
and an undercover officer—both of whom were the primary wit-
nesses.65 These witnesses presented conflicting testimony at the
trial.66 According to the officer, the petitioner knowingly participated
in the drug transaction on behalf of her brother.67 Unlike the officer,
the petitioner testified that she was coerced into running an errand
for her brother, and she claimed to not know that drugs were in-
volved.68 The defense presented additional testimony from a friend of
the petitioner that corroborated a portion of the petitioner’s testimony,
but the friend did not actually witness the transaction.69
Ultimately, the case ended in jury deadlock.70 The prosecution re-
tried the petitioner, and the jury once again was unable to reach a
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012) (emphasis added). When federal courts are review-
ing the state court determinations, those determinations “must be unreasonable,
as opposed to merely incorrect” for habeas relief to be appropriate. Ouber v. Gua-
rino, 293 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Taylor, 529 U.S. at 410).
60. See Bahtuoh II, 2016 WL 2727465, at *12 (“This standard is, and was meant to
be, difficult to meet.”) (citing Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20 (2013)).
61. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 871.
62. See Duncan, supra note 43, at 1703 (noting that satisfying both the Strickland
standard and the AEDPA standard may make habeas relief for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims “virtually unattainable”).
63. Ouber, 293 F.3d at 25–26.
64. Id. at 21. To clarify, the petitioner was the defendant in the trial court.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 21–22.
70. Id. at 22.
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verdict.71 The prosecution retried the petitioner a third time and was
successful in securing a conviction.72
Unlike the first two trials, counsel for the defense changed strategy
midway through the third trial.73 In his opening statement, counsel
for the defense promised the jury four times that the petitioner would
testify.74 Counsel stressed the value of this testimony to the jury and
told them that the case would revolve around the petitioner’s knowl-
edge of the drugs.75 Thus, defense counsel instructed the jury to weigh
the credibility of the petitioner’s testimony against the officer’s.76 Un-
like the first two trials, however, the defense rested in the third trial
without calling the petitioner to testify.77 In his closing arguments,
counsel apologized to the jury for the petitioner’s lack of testimony but
explained that he no longer needed the defendant to testify because
the prosecution did not prove its case.78 Despite this justification, the
jury returned a guilty verdict.79
The petitioner in Ouber alleged an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim in state court.80 In support of her claim, the petitioner claimed
she wanted to testify, but her lawyer advised her otherwise.81 Fur-
ther, the attorney was allegedly ineffective by making opening state-
ment promises to have the petitioner testify and later breaking this
promise.82
The state court was unpersuaded.83 It found that the petitioner
knowingly waived her right to testify.84 It also found the attorney’s
opening statements were cautiously made and that the attorney
merely shifted strategy when he decided not to have the petitioner
testify.85 The petitioner was denied a new trial.86 The Massachusetts
Appeals Court affirmed this decision, and the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court denied further review.87 After exhausting her options
at the state level, the petitioner sought habeas relief.88
71. Id.
72. Id. at 23.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 22.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 23.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 24.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 31.
85. Id. at 24.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately granted the Ouber
petitioner habeas relief.89 The First Circuit began its analysis by ap-
plying the Strickland standard.90 The court emphasized that defense
counsel’s decision to not have the defendant testify midway through
trial was unreasonable.91 The court refused to attribute the attorney’s
decision to a mere strategy shift.92 The court noted that counsel had
the benefit of knowing how the prior two trials unfolded and also
found that the third trial was only marginally different.93 As such,
there were not unforeseen developments that defense counsel needed
to strategically account for when he decided not to have the defendant
testify.94 Thus, the First Circuit found that the attorney’s conduct was
unreasonable, thereby satisfying the first prong of the Strickland
standard.95 Moreover, the court found that counsel’s decision satisfied
the second prong of the Strickland standard because it prejudiced his
client.96 It did so because breaking an opening statement promise to
have the defendant testify paints the defendant and the lawyer nega-
tively in the eyes of the jury.97
The First Circuit then proceeded to criticize the state court’s appli-
cation of Strickland.98 First, the court pointed to the fact that the at-
torney in Ouber did not fully inform his client of the possible
consequences of not testifying.99 As a result, it was irrelevant whether
the petitioner waived her right to testify because the decision was not
made knowingly.100 Second, the First Circuit found it unacceptable to
make an opening statement promise unconditionally and repeatedly—
only to break it without justification.101 The decision was not a valid
89. Id. at 25, 36. Before reaching the First Circuit Court of Appeals, the petitioner’s
case was heard in the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts. Id. at 25. The federal district court found the petitioner was entitled to
habeas relief, but for reasons somewhat different than the First Circuit. Id. The
federal district court ordered the petitioner to be released or, in the alternative,
for the petitioner to have her conviction vacated and for the petitioner to receive a
new trial. Id. This case was then appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
Id.
90. Id. at 27–28.
91. Id. at 28.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 29.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 30.
96. Id. at 28.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 31–32.
99. Id. at 31 (explaining that the defendant must be informed “of the consequences of
the decision” to waive her right to testify).
100. Id. One of the justifications provided by the state court was that counsel’s behav-
ior was reasonable because the petitioner knowingly waived her right to testify.
Id.
101. Id. In response to the lower court’s characterization of the attorney’s opening
statements as a “cautious” decision, the court responded, “the record makes man-
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strategy shift because there were not unexpected developments dur-
ing the trial.102 The First Circuit also explained that the only sensible
outcome that could be drawn from the record was that the attorney’s
conduct prejudiced the defendant.103 Ultimately, the court found that
the state court “unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] . . . clearly established Fed-
eral law”104 because the state court unreasonably applied the Strick-
land standard.105 Accordingly, the court granted the petitioner
habeas relief.106
Thus, Ouber gave the First Circuit occasion to apply both the
Strickland standard and the AEDPA standard in the context of an
attorney reneging on opening statement promises.107 This case high-
lighted the Strickland standard’s presumption of reasonableness for
counsels’ decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel claims.108 The
Ouber decision also reinforced that AEDPA demands deference to
state court determinations when petitioners seek habeas relief.109
Ouber demonstrates, however, that it is possible to grant a petitioner
habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel even when the claim
must be assessed through the prism of these deferential standards.110
III. MAIN CASE: THE BAHTUOH TRILOGY
A. Bahtuoh I
For a number of years, Christopher Bahtuoh was in touch with
members of the I-9 gang.111 In 2009, Bahtuoh was driving with La-
mont McGee, one of the I-9 gang members.112 While driving, Bahtuoh
recognized Kyle Parker standing with a few people.113 Parker was a
member of the Taliban gang—a rival of the I-9 gang.114 Bahtuoh
drove in Parker’s direction and stopped his vehicle next to Parker.115
ifest that trial counsel’s approach to the question of calling the petitioner as a
witness—making an unconditional promise, repeating it four times over, and
then breaking it without justification—was the antithesis of caution.” Id.
102. Id. at 31–32.
103. See id. at 33–34, 35 (finding this case was exceedingly close due to the unique
procedural history of two prior cases ending in deadlock, thereby magnifying the
weight of the attorney’s decision and its expected impact on the jury).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
105. Ouber, 293 F.3d at 35.
106. Id. at 36.
107. Id. at 34.
108. Id. at 25.
109. Id. at 20.
110. See id. at 36.
111. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh III), 855 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2017).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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Upon stopping, McGee shot Parker in the chest.116 Bahtuoh drove off
and eventually went into hiding.117 Parker died as a result of the
shooting.118 Prior to his death, Parker told his sister that Bahtuoh
was responsible for the shooting.119
After six weeks passed, Bahtuoh turned himself in.120 Bahtuoh ad-
mitted the shots that killed Parker had been fired from his vehicle.121
A grand jury indicted Bahtuoh for first and second degree murder, and
the case proceeded to trial.122
As part of trial strategy, Bahtuoh and his attorney determined that
Bahtuoh would testify before the jury.123 Bahtuoh’s attorney incorpo-
rated this fact into his opening statements.124 Specifically, Bahtuoh’s
attorney made the following statements:
You also know that Mr. Bahtuoh has a right to remain silent. He will
waive that right. He made three statements to the police. He testified before
the grand jury under oath. And he’s going to talk to you during this trial. And
he is going to tell you the truth. . . .
He also has a conviction for an aggravated robbery, and he’ll tell you about
that as well. . . .
Mr. Bahtuoh will tell you how Lamont McGee came to get into his car, and
why Mr. Bahtuoh had a good reason to believe that Lamont McGee was not
armed that day. It turns out that he was armed that day, but Mr. Bahtuoh did
not know that at the time they were driving around. . . .
I would ask you to keep an open mind, to continue to presume Mr. Bahtuoh
innocent, wait for the whole trial to unfold before you. Wait until he takes the
stand and tells you what happened.125
Despite the initial strategy, his attorney eventually decided
against having Bahtuoh testify and advised Bahtuoh as such.126 Bah-
tuoh’s attorney purportedly did not believe the state had strong
enough evidence to convict Bahtuoh.127 Further, Bahtuoh’s attorney
believed this decision was appropriate because the state had already
introduced Bahtuoh’s grand jury testimony into the record and as
such, Bahtuoh did not need to restate this testimony.128 During his
closing arguments, Bahtuoh’s attorney attempted to rectify this “stra-
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. State v. Bahtuoh (Bahtuoh I), 840 N.W.2d 804, 808 (Minn. 2013).
120. Id.
121. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 870.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 816.
125. Id.
126. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 870.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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tegic” choice to the jury.129 Specifically, the attorney’s closing argu-
ments included the following statements:
One of the things I want to get straight right away is that Mr. Bahtuoh did not
take the stand. I told you he would. That’s my fault. However, why should I
put him on the stand? Why should I? When they didn’t prove their case and
you got his grand jury testimony read to you, which he gave under oath . . .
which exonerates him. Why would I put a 20-year-old young man up against
an experienced prosecutor? I’m not going to do that. Because when you start
doing that, you may start weighing, well, we don’t like his mannerisms, we
don’t like him. We don’t like the way he sat in the chair. Any number of things
you could—you start taking the burden of proof away from the government
and putting it on the defense. There was no need to put him on the stand
because the government didn’t prove their case and his truthful story came
across in his grand jury testimony . . . .130
Although the jury acquitted Bahtuoh of premeditated murder in the
first degree, it convicted him of first degree felony murder and second
degree murder.131 The court sentenced Bahtuoh to life in prison, with
the potential to be released after thirty-one years.132
After the trial, Bahtuoh sought post-conviction relief due to ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel.133 At the heart of his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, Bahtuoh argued that it was an error for counsel to
promise Bahtuoh’s testimony to the jury during opening statements
and to later renege on that promise.134 At his post-conviction eviden-
tiary hearing, Bahtuoh stated he was “shocked” and “confused” at
counsel’s decision to not have him testify.135 Further, Bahtuoh stated
that his counsel never explained the possible ramifications of not
testifying.136
The court did not find Bahtuoh’s counsel to be ineffective.137 First,
Bahtuoh waived his right to remain silent when he originally made
statements to the police about the case.138 As such, the court reasoned
129. Id.
130. Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 817.
131. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 870.
132. Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 808.
133. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 870. Ineffective assistance of counsel was not the only
allegation forwarded by Bahtuoh following his conviction. Bahtuoh also asserted
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction, that the district
court gave incorrect jury instructions on accomplice liability, that there was
prosecutorial misconduct, that Bahtuoh did not waive his right to testify at trial
voluntarily, and that “his right to a public trial” was violated. Bahtuoh I, 840
N.W.2d at 808. Bahtuoh was granted only a post-conviction evidentiary hearing
on his claim that he did not voluntarily waive his right to testify. Id. at 808–09.
Procedurally, the Minnesota Supreme Court “consolidated Bahtuoh’s direct and
postconviction appeals into a single proceeding” for review. Id. at 809.
134. Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 817–18.
135. Id. at 809. Again, this hearing was held on Bahtuoh’s claim that he did not volun-
tarily waive his right to testify. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 818.
138. Id. at 817.
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that Bahtuoh’s attorney had a good faith belief at the outset of trial
that Bahtuoh would again waive his rights by testifying before the
jury.139 Second, the prosecution’s case was apparently weaker than
defense counsel originally anticipated.140 Further, the prosecution
read a portion of Bahtuoh’s grand jury testimony into the record.141
The court found these factors to be unforeseen developments for Bah-
tuoh’s attorney.142 Given these unforeseen developments, the court
reasoned that Bahtuoh’s attorney made a reasonable strategy shift by
advising his client not to testify.143 The court also noted that Bahtuoh
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify on the record.144
Finally, the court distinguished this case from Ouber.145 It ex-
plained that the Ouber defendant’s testimony was central to that case
because several witnesses had testified to the defendant’s reputation
for truthfulness.146 Moreover, it explained that the attorney’s decision
in Ouber was objectively unreasonable in light of its lengthy procedu-
ral history—a history which was not present in Bahtuoh’s case.147 Ul-
timately, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied Bahtuoh’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.148
B. Bahtuoh II
Bahtuoh raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in federal
court in an attempt to obtain habeas relief.149 For Bahtuoh to success-
fully raise a habeas claim for relief in federal court, the Minnesota
state court must have either unreasonably applied the Strickland
standard or unreasonably determined the facts.150 Bahtuoh argued he
was entitled to habeas relief because the state court’s decision was
based upon an unreasonable application of law and an “unreasonable
determination of the facts.”151 The court explained that to meet the
rigorous standard for habeas relief, Bahtuoh needed to demonstrate
that “the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling on his ineffective assis-
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 817–18.
143. Id. The court also noted, “To the extent that Bahtuoh’s ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim involves matters of trial strategy, we do not second-guess trial
counsel’s decisions about trial strategy.” Id. at 818 n.3 (citing Andersen v. State,
830 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn. 2013)). Of course, this begs the question of whether an
attorney can call anything “trial strategy” to avoid an ineffectiveness claim.
144. Id. at 816.
145. Id. at 818.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh III), 855 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2017).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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tance claim was an error ‘beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.’”152
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
found that the state court reasonably applied the Strickland stan-
dard.153 In its decision, the court described Bahtuoh as a “corner
case.”154 The Eighth Circuit had previously held that it is not per se
unreasonable for an attorney to renege on opening statement
promises to present witnesses as a general matter.155 Because the
promised witness in this case was the defendant, however, the court
found that this case did not neatly fit within its established prece-
dent.156 Ultimately, the court stated that this case “falls between the
cracks[,] suggest[ing] that fairminded jurists could conclude Bah-
tuoh’s attorney acted reasonably under the circumstances, thereby
precluding habeas relief.”157 In the eyes of the federal district court,
Bahtuoh’s claim could not survive the first prong of the Strickland
standard. This court also briefly addressed the second prong of the
Strickland standard and determined that the attorney’s conduct did
not prejudice Bahtuoh.158 As a result, the federal district court did not
grant Bahtuoh habeas relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel.159
C. Bahtuoh III
Bahtuoh’s case made its way to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.160 As the federal district court had done, the Eighth Circuit re-
viewed how the state court applied the Strickland standard, subject to
the more rigorous AEDPA standard for habeas relief.161 Thus, the
Eighth Circuit assessed (1) whether the state court unreasonably ap-
plied the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and
(2) whether the state court’s “decision was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts.”162
In considering the first question, the Eighth Circuit was highly def-
erential to the state court’s application of the Strickland standard.163
First, the court noted the Strickland standard is inherently deferen-
152. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh II), No. 14-CV-5009, 2016 WL 2727465, at *12 (D.
Minn. Apr. 12, 2016) (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
153. Id. at *16.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at *17.
160. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh III), 855 F.3d 868, 868 (8th Cir. 2017).
161. Id. at 871.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 872.
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tial because it includes the “strong presumption” of reasonableness.164
Further, the court noted the Strickland standard itself is “broad and
general.”165 Thus, according to the Eighth Circuit, when analyzing an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the rigorous AEDPA
standard of review, courts have significant room to find an attorney’s
conduct reasonable.166 As such, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that its
review should be “doubly deferential.”167
The Eighth Circuit found that the Minnesota Supreme Court did
not unreasonably apply the Strickland standard in Bahtuoh I.168 The
Eighth Circuit found it reasonable to conclude that counsel’s decision
to change strategy was the product of unexpected developments in the
trial.169 The court also found it reasonable to conclude that Bahtuoh’s
attorney did not fall below the “objective standard of reason-
ableness.”170
The court supported its decision by partially relying on another
Eighth Circuit case.171 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit drew attention
to Williams v. Bowersox, in which the court held that “failing to pre-
sent witnesses promised in an opening is not always an error of a con-
stitutional dimension.”172 In Williams, the attorney decided not to
present a witness’s testimony after the state called many of the antici-
pated defense witnesses.173 Thus, in the Eighth Circuit’s view, the at-
torney’s decision in Williams was somewhat analogous to the
attorney’s decision in Bahtuoh I.174
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit supported its conclusion by citing to
contrasting decisions from other courts.175 Overall, courts have come
to different conclusions on whether an attorney can renege on an
164. Id. (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011)). Notably, the presump-
tions embedded in the Strickland standard have been a source of controversy. See
Duncan, supra note 43, at 1697 (“In determining the constitutionality of legal
representation, the scales should not be tilted in favor of either party—not the
prisoner and not the government. The purpose of ineffective assistance of counsel
law is not to facilitate a finding of incompetent lawyering; neither should it be
about hindering a finding of constitutionally infirm lawyering. An ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim should be about determining whether a criminal defen-
dant’s constitutional rights were violated, a determination that should be made
without one side benefitting from presumptions.”).
165. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 872.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. Id. (citing Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671–72 (8th Cir. 2003)).
172. Id. (citing Williams, 340 F.3d at 671–72).
173. Id. (citing Williams, 340 F.3d at 669).
174. See id.
175. Id.
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opening statement promise to have a defendant testify.176 The Eighth
Circuit also referenced Ouber to reinforce the existence of this disa-
greement among courts.177 For the Eighth Circuit, the fact that these
disagreements exist supported a finding of reasonableness.178 The
Eighth Circuit found that the state court reasonably applied Strick-
land for purposes of the AEDPA standard.179 Thus, the Eighth Circuit
did not analyze Bahtuoh’s case under the second prong of the Strick-
land standard—whether the conduct of Bahtuoh’s attorney prejudiced
Bahtuoh to the jury.180
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the state court’s
decision was not based upon an unreasonable determination of the
facts.181 The court explained that “[a] state court[’s] decision is based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts only if the ‘court’s pre-
sumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the re-
cord.’”182 The court found that the record supported the state court’s
determination: the attorney was justified in his decision because  the
“weaknesses in the state’s case” were unforeseen developments.183
Further, the court found support in the record demonstrating that
counsel “weighed the risks” of not having Bahtuoh testify.184 Thus,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Bahtuoh’s claim for
habeas relief.185
IV. ANALYSIS
The Eighth Circuit did not render a careful opinion when it decided
the Bahutoh case. Ample authority suggests that an attorney’s deci-
sion to renege on an opening statement promise to have a defendant
testify falls outside of the reasonable standard of professional con-
176. Compare Francis v. State, 183 S.W.3d 288, 301–05 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (finding
that an attorney’s decision to renege on opening statement promises to have the
defendant testify did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel), and Yancey
v. Hall, 237 F. Supp. 2d 128, 134–35 (D. Mass. 2002) (same), with Williams v.
Woodford, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1162–65 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (finding ineffective
assistance of counsel for reneging on an opening statement promise to have de-
fendant testify), and Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 36 (1st Cir. 2002) (same).
177. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 872.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 873.
180. Id. As previously explained, courts are not required to analyze the attorney’s per-
formance under both prongs if the court finds that one prong is not satisfied.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984).
181. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 874.
182. Id. at 873 (citing Evenstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 2006)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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duct.186 A careful application of Strickland demonstrates that Bah-
tuoh’s attorney was likely deficient, and Bahtuoh was prejudiced as a
result of that deficiency. Moreover, there are compelling reasons to
believe that the state court’s decision was not only incorrect but also
unreasonably rendered. Rather than conducting a careful review of
Bahtuoh I, the Eighth Circuit seemed to allow its analysis to be
clouded by its “doubly deferential”187 approach. Unfortunately, this
case demonstrates how such a deferential approach can set a negative
precedent for what counts as acceptable legal representation in crimi-
nal cases.
A. Application of Strickland: The First Prong
The attorney in Bahtuoh made decisions that do not rise to the
level of objectively reasonable tactics. It can be objectively reasonable
for an attorney to have a defendant testify and to present this infor-
mation in opening statements.188 Similarly, it can be objectively rea-
sonable for an attorney to decide not to have a defendant testify at
trial.189 It is unreasonable, however, for an attorney to pursue both
strategies without significant, unexpected developments in the
trial.190 As explained by the court in Ouber, “Taken alone, each of
these decisions may have fallen within the broad universe of accept-
able professional judgments. Taken together, however, they are
indefensible.”191
Attorneys are not beholden to a strict set of regimented guidelines
for how to represent a criminal defendant.192 Rather, counsel has the
independence and flexibility to zealously advocate on behalf of their
client in whatever way professional judgment dictates.193 But there
are still some rough guidelines that can be used for these determina-
tions. For example, the Strickland Court noted that the American Bar
Association (ABA) standards for Criminal Justice serve as a helpful
guideline for determining what constitutes reasonable professional
186. Williams v. Woodford, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (explaining
that juries will be likely to “draw negative inferences” when the promised defen-
dant does not testify); Madrigal v. Yates, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1184 (C.D. Cal.
2009) (explaining that reneging on opening statement promises constitutes “defi-
cient performance” when not done in response to “unforeseeable events”); Ouber
v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 36 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that reneging on opening
statement promise to have defendant testify amounts to a “serious error in pro-
fessional judgment”).
187. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 872 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190
(2011)).
188. See Ouber, 293 F.3d at 27.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
193. Id.
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judgment.194 This is because these standards represent the “bar’s ex-
pression of the minimal duties owed clients.”195 Ultimately, the ABA
standards and case law196 support the conclusion that Bahtuoh’s at-
torney acted unreasonably when he reneged on his opening statement
promises.
A cursory examination of the ABA guidelines supports the infer-
ence that the so-called strategy employed by Bahtuoh’s attorney was
unacceptable. Notably, the guidelines provide that a defense attorney
ought to anticipate the importance of preparing opening state-
ments.197 The guidelines provide, “Defense counsel’s opening state-
ment at trial should be confined to a fair statement of the case from
the defense counsel’s perspective, and discussion of evidence that de-
fense counsel reasonably believes in good faith will be available, of-
fered, and admitted.”198 Given these basic guidelines, Bahtuoh’s
attorney should have carefully considered the impact of making open-
ing statement promises and the potential consequences of breaking
opening statement promises.
Bahtuoh’s attorney failed to consider the potential consequences of
breaking his opening statement promises. Juries can be tempted to
infer that a defendant is guilty when the defendant fails to testify.199
As a result of this temptation, courts take precautionary measures to
prevent juries from drawing such inferences.200 However, these mea-
sures are imperfect, and a defense attorney can exacerbate the jury’s
inherent temptation of inferring guilt by drawing the jury’s attention
to the defendant’s failure to testify.201 Candidly stated, “[w]hen a de-
fendant’s own lawyer causes jurors to wonder why he did not testify,
this is a self-inflicted wound that’s bound to undermine a defendant’s
presumption of innocence.”202 For that reason, Bahtuoh’s attorney’s
194. Id. at 688.
195. Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 21 (1994).
196. Williams v. Woodford, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1164 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Madrigal v.
Yates, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Ouber, 293 F.3d at 36.
197. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, standard 4-7.5
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). There is authority to suggest that many attorneys have a
shared understanding of the importance of opening statements. See O’Connor,
supra note 2, at 100 (“[M]any practitioners . . . believe that up to 80 percent of
jurors decide the case during opening statements.”).
198. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, standard 4-7.5
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
199. Williams, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 1164 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
200. Id. (citing Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981)) (explaining that precaution-
ary measures include instructions not to infer guilt from a defendant’s failure to
testify and instructions regarding burdens of proof).
201. Id.
202. Id.
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decision to renege was careless in the absence of unexpected develop-
ments during trial.
Contrary to the assertions made by the state court and by the
Eighth Circuit, the attorney’s decision to not have Bahtuoh testify was
not based upon “unexpected” developments at trial.203 According to
those courts, the unexpected developments in this case included the
possibility of Bahtuoh getting impeached on cross-examination, the
fact that the prosecution presented the defendant’s grand jury testi-
mony during its case-in-chief, and the weakness of the prosecution’s
case.204 All of these developments should have been reasonably fore-
seen at the outset of trial—prior to opening statements. Moreover,
that the defense counsel “weighed the risks” of his client not testify-
ing205 is unpersuasive when viewed in context of the overall trial.206
Prior to delivering opening statements, Bahtuoh’s attorney should
have anticipated the possibility of Bahtuoh being impeached on cross-
examination. In his closing arguments, Bahtuoh’s attorney claimed
that he did not want to subject his client to cross-examination by an
experienced prosecutor.207 The attorney also did not want the jury to
judge the defendant based upon his mannerisms on the stand.208 Both
of these arguments fail to withstand scrutiny. First, the attorney had
at least some interaction with his client prior to trial.209 As such, the
attorney should have been able to assess whether Bahtuoh was likely
to be a credible witness or vulnerable to rigorous cross-examina-
tion.210 Moreover, the attorney referenced Bahtuoh’s criminal history
in his opening statements, suggesting that he anticipated Bahtuoh
getting impeached on the stand.211 Second, from his own interactions
203. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh III), 855 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2017).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 874.
206. See Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[A] defendant’s decision
about whether to invoke the right to remain silent is a strategic choice, requiring
a balancing of risks and benefits. Under ordinary circumstances, that is true.”
(emphasis added)).
207. State v. Bahtuoh (Bahtuoh I), 840 N.W.2d 804, 817 (Minn. 2013) (“Why would I
put a 20-year-old young man up against an experienced prosecutor?”).
208. Id. (“[Y]ou may start weighing, well, we don’t like his mannerisms, we don’t like
him.”).
209. See Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 870 (explaining that Bahtuoh and his attorney col-
lectively made the decision before trial that Bahtuoh would testify).
210. See United States ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 258 (7th Cir. 2003)
(finding that a defense attorney should be able to reasonably assess his or her
client’s “strengths and weaknesses as a prospective defense witness” prior to
trial); see also Ouber, 293 F.3d at 29 (explaining that counsel knew that the pros-
ecution may impeach the defendant when he made the opening statement).
211. As explained by the federal district court, “In anticipation of Bahtuoh’s testimony
and subsequent impeachment on the stand, defense counsel went so far as to
preemptively disclose during his opening statement that Bahtuoh had previously
been convicted for aggravated robbery . . . even though that information would
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with his client, the attorney should have been able to assess whether
Bahtuoh would have unflattering mannerisms on the stand.212 The
facts do not suggest that these pre-trial assessments were altered
mid-trial. As such, Bahtuoh’s attorney should have considered the
likelihood of impeachment at the outset of trial.
Moreover, the fact that the prosecution introduced Bahtuoh’s
grand jury testimony into the record was not an unexpected develop-
ment. This was not a case where Bahtuoh’s attorney changed or aban-
doned his anticipated defense mid-trial213 or a case where the
prosecution’s strategy uniquely implicated the attorney’s decision to
have the defendant testify.214 Bahtuoh’s attorney was fully aware of
the content of his client’s grand-jury testimony prior to trial.215 Even
if the attorney did not believe that the prosecution would introduce
the testimony into the record, the introduction of the testimony did
not alter the defense’s main strategy—that Bahtuoh did not believe
McGee was armed.216 At worst, the grand jury testimony may have
made Bahtuoh’s trial testimony redundant. However, the risk of re-
dundancy, even when considered alongside the attorney’s other justifi-
cations for not having Bahtuoh testify, did not overwhelm the
potential consequences of breaking his opening statement promise.217
As noted by one court, “By promising the jury that [the defendant]
would testify, and would do so as to specific facts, the lawyer raised
certain expectations in the jurors’ minds, expectations that would
count heavily against [the defendant] when they went unfulfilled.”218
not have been admissible if Bahtuoh did not testify.” Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh
II), No. 14-CV-5009, 2016 WL 2727465, at *11 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 2016).
212. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 874.
213. See Yancey v. Hall, 237 F. Supp. 2d 128, 134 (D. Mass. 2002); see also Anderson v.
Butler, 858 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1988) (explaining that the choice to abandon a
defense can be a plausible strategy shift).
214. See Francis v. State, 183 S.W.3d 288, 301–05 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that
when the prosecution did not present evidence of damaging statements from the
defendant as originally anticipated, it was reasonable for the attorney to renege
on opening statement promises of the defendant testifying in order to avoid sub-
jecting the defendant to cross-examination on those damaging statements).
215. Id.
216. State v. Bahtuoh (Bahtuoh I), 840 N.W.2d 804, 816 (Minn. 2013) (“Mr. Bahtuoh
will tell you . . . why Mr. Bahtuoh had a good reason to believe that Lamont
McGee was not armed that day.”).
217. See Williams v. Woodford, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1164 (E.D. Cal. 2012). Not eve-
ryone would agree with this, however. According to the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota, having Bahtuoh testify may have resulted in
Bahtuoh getting convicted of first degree premeditated murder, which would
have “entombed him forever inside a penitentiary.” Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh
II), No. 14-CV-5009, 2016 WL 2727465, at *17 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 2016).
218. Williams, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
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Further, the weakness of the prosecution’s case did not justify a
mid-trial strategy shift. Attorneys are expected to prepare for trial.219
In light of such preparation, this argument logically shatters. Assume
that Bahtuoh’s attorney expected the prosecution’s case to be strong at
the outset of trial. It is possible that Bahtuoh’s attorney believed his
client’s testimony would bolster his defense against a strong case.
Consequently, his opening statement promise reflected a calculated
belief that his client’s testimony was strong evidence. If true, then
Bahtuoh’s attorney should not have abandoned such evidence to re-
spond to a prosecution’s allegedly weakened case.220
It is also possible that Bahtuoh’s attorney believed, at the outset of
trial, that it would be risky to have his client testify. Perhaps he was
uncertain about whether his client would perform well on cross-exami-
nation, and he might have been concerned with how the jurors would
receive his client. Moreover, at the end of the day, there is always a
risk that a prosecution’s case may prove stronger or weaker than a
defense attorney initially predicts. In light of those considerations,
Bahtuoh’s attorney should have concluded that the value of his client’s
testimony at trial could easily change, depending on how the prosecu-
tor’s case unraveled. In that world, the attorney should not have made
a robust promise that Bahtuoh would testify when he delivered his
opening statement; he should have simply refrained and reserved
himself the flexibility to make a sturdier judgment call after the prose-
cution rested its case.221 By making the tactical decision to promise
the jury this testimony, the attorney planted a seed of Bahtuoh’s testi-
mony in the minds of the jurors—a seed that he could not easily dig
up.222
In short, it is a bold move for an attorney to make a promise in
opening statements that his or her client will testify. Thus, a defense
219. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, standard 4-4.6
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
220. See Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[I]t remains a mystery
why, in response to adverse evidence that proves stronger than expected, a law-
yer should decide to abandon the only available avenue of controverting it.”); see
also Williams, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (“Sometimes, all that a defense lawyer can
do is point to weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. Acquittals have certainly been
gained that way. But it’s far harder to persuade a jury to acquit based on weak-
nesses in the prosecution’s case when the jury has been promised exculpatory
testimony from percipient witnesses, including defendant himself. The jury will
draw negative inferences from the unexplained absence of the promised testi-
mony, and these inferences will fill any gaps that might otherwise exist in the
prosecution’s case.”).
221. See Ouber, 293 F.3d at 25–26 (“It is easy to imagine that, on the eve of trial, a
thoughtful lawyer may remain unsure as to whether to call the defendant as a
witness. If such uncertainty exists, however, it is an abecedarian principle that
the lawyer must exercise some degree of circumspection. Had the petitioner’s
counsel temporized . . . this would be a different case.”).
222. See id.
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attorney preparing for trial must reasonably weigh both the risks and
benefits of having the client testify.223 Importantly, the attorney must
also consider possible contingencies that could alter this decision. The
attorney must then calculate whether, in light of those contingencies,
it is reasonably safe to proclaim to members of the jury that the client
will take the stand and profess his or her innocence.
To boldly promise Bahtuoh’s testimony in his opening statements,
the attorney should have either (1) been confident enough in his cli-
ent’s testimony that he would not change course unless truly unantici-
pated events occurred or (2) understood the inherent risks associated
with having his client testify and given himself enough elasticity to
change his mind. There were not truly unanticipated events that oc-
curred in this trial. That the prosecution’s case proved weaker than
the attorney originally predicted was a contingency that should have
been factored into the attorney’s initial trial preparation.
Additionally, case law supports the conclusion that Bahtuoh’s at-
torney was deficient. Cases from different jurisdictions have found
that a defense attorney’s decision to break opening statement
promises can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.224 Although
the Eighth Circuit was not bound by these cases, “[t]o the extent that
inferior federal courts have decided factually similar cases, reference
. . . may be especially helpful when the governing Supreme Court pre-
cedent articulates a broad principle that applies to a wide variety of
factual patterns.”225 Thus, given the Eighth Circuit’s admission that
the Strickland standard was broad,226 the court arguably should have
given more consideration to factually similar cases. At the very least,
these cases might have put Bahtuoh’s attorney on notice of the poten-
tial consequences of his strategy shift and prompted him to consider
alternative strategies.227
223. See Williams, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
224. See id. at 1154, 1161, 1163 (granting habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)
and finding ineffective assistance of counsel when the defense attorney promised
the jury ten times that his client would testify); Ouber, 293 F.3d at 27; see also
Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding ineffective assistance
of counsel when the defense attorney failed to present testimony from a psycholo-
gist promised during opening statements).
225. Ouber, 293 F.3d at 26 (citing O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 1998)).
226. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh III), 855 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining the
broadness of the Strickland standard as a justification for its deferential
approach).
227. In theory, if Bahtuoh’s attorney was correct in believing the prosecution’s case
was weak, then after the government rested, the attorney could have made a
Rule 29 motion, which allows the court to “enter a judgment of acquittal of any
offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 29. Given that the Minnesota Supreme Court found there was sufficient
evidence to convict Bahtuoh, this claim may very well have been unsuccessful,
but at the very least would have lend credence to the reasonableness of the attor-
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It is plausible to argue counsel was reasonable because the defen-
dant consented to the change in strategy.228 As noted by the Strick-
land Court, “The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be
determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own state-
ments or actions.”229 This should not be determinative, however. Lay
people generally lack the expertise necessary to make the most in-
formed decision regarding the best legal strategy.230 As a result, even
if individuals are asked to make decisions regarding how to proceed in
legal cases, many defer to the expertise of counsel.231 In this case, the
record reflects Bahtuoh’s expression of “shock” when his attorney ad-
vised him not to testify,232 suggesting that Bahtuoh was not initially
comfortable with this strategy.233 Despite Bahtuoh’s consent on the
record, this decision was likely informed by the advice of his attor-
ney.234 A client’s consent should not determine whether counsel’s con-
duct is effective because such logic would absolve the attorney merely
because the client acquiesced to the attorney’s improper advice.
For the foregoing reasons, Bahtuoh’s attorney fell below the objec-
tive reasonableness standard. Moreover, the arguments above demon-
strate that the state court’s decision was not merely improper, but
unreasonable. To ascertain whether the attorney’s conduct was rea-
sonable, the state court indicated that Bahtuoh’s attorney had a good
ney’s conduct. See State v. Bahtuoh (Bahtuoh I), 840 N.W.2d 804, 811 (Minn.
2013).
228. The Eighth Circuit did not use this argument in support of its reasonableness
analysis, relying instead on the attorney’s shift in strategy. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d
at 872–73. However, this claim was quite important for the state court that ini-
tially denied Bahtuoh’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Bahtuoh v. Smith
(Bahtuoh II), No. 14-CV-5009, 2016 WL 2727465, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 2016)
(“Bahtuoh’s ineffective-assistance claim would entirely rise or fall on the question
of whether his waiver of the right to testify was knowing and voluntary.”).
229. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
230. See Zelnick, supra note 10, at 371.
231. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
232. Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 809.
233. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court was unpersuaded by Bahtuoh’s claim
that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to testify on the basis
that Bahtuoh’s post-conviction statements at the evidentiary hearing were incon-
sistent, the federal district court raised concerns about whether this was an accu-
rate reading of Bahtuoh’s statements. Bahtuoh II, 2016 WL 2727465, at *9–10
(“Bahtuoh’s testimony at the colloquy, read literally, does not confirm that his
waiver of the right to testify was knowing.”). Ultimately, the court found it rea-
sonable to conclude that Bahtuoh knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
testify and importantly, the court did not find that Bahtuoh “rebutted the factual
findings of the trial court by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at *10.
234. Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 815. This point is further evidenced by the fact that
Bahtuoh raised a claim in the lower courts that he did not voluntarily and know-
ingly decide not to testify. Id. Nevertheless, the court was unpersuaded by this
claim because Bahtuoh’s testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing
was considered “internally inconsistent” and because those at the hearing were in
a stronger position to ascertain Bahutoh’s credibility. Id. at 815–16.
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faith reason to believe that Bahtuoh would be willing to waive his
rights and testify at the trial.235 Moreover, the court cited to the attor-
ney’s collective justifications for not having Bahtuoh testify.236 It
found that these representations demonstrated that he “weighed the
risks of Bahtuoh testifying against the risk associated with failing to
fulfill the representations that he made to the jury during his opening
statement.”237 Importantly, the court found that he “weighed those
risks in light of new information—the strength of the State’s case—
that he did not know at the beginning of the trial.”238
The state court failed, however, to carefully analyze whether the
attorney’s justifications were reasonable and how the attorney’s
weighing of those risks was reasonable. The state court did not closely
explore whether the “strength of the State’s case” could have been
foreseen at the outset of trial or why it was reasonable for that “new
information” to tip the attorney’s decision in favor of breaking the
promise. The state court never detailed how the explanations offered
by the attorney—the possibility of impeachment, the introduction of
his grand jury testimony, and the strength of the prosecution’s case—
collectively could justify taking the significant risk of reneging on his
opening statement representations. Rather, the state court appeared
to take the attorney’s justifications at face-value. But as this section
has attempted to illustrate, the attorney’s justifications for breaking
his opening statement promise seem to be objectively unreasonable
when considered in the context of the overall trial.
Additionally, the state court also distinguished the facts of the pre-
sent case from those of Ouber.239 In particular, the court focused pri-
marily on Ouber’s extensive procedural history as a guide for whether
235. Id. at 817.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 818. The court stated that Bahtuoh failed to “provid[e] specific facts to sup-
port his claim that trial counsel’s performance was deficient,” relying instead on
Ouber. Id. at 817. However, it is somewhat curious that the court makes this
claim when considering the specific claims being asserted in Bahtuoh’s reply
brief. Appellant’s Reply Brief, State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. 2013)
(Nos. A10-1584, A12-1281), 2012 WL 10133625, at *7 (“Mr. Bahtuoh’s promised
testimony would specifically explain his relationship with the victim and the
shooter and provide the jury with Mr. Bahtuoh’s basis for believing the shooter
was unarmed that evening. Mr. Bahtuoh’s unpresented testimony would show he
had no knowledge of nor intent to participate in the crime. Without Mr. Bah-
tuoh’s testimony, that evidence was not furnished through any other means.”).
Bahtuoh II also made note of this. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh II), No. 14-CV-
5009, 2016 WL 2727465, at *13 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 2016) (“It is not entirely clear
what the Minnesota Supreme Court meant by the comment, but Bahtuoh but-
tressed his ineffective-assistance claim with several specific factual contentions
that, at a minimum, cast doubt upon the reasonableness of counsel’s decision.”).
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the attorney exhibited reasonable professional judgment.240 However,
the court failed to explain why a different procedural history necessa-
rily meant that Bahtuoh’s attorney was not ineffective. The court
failed to provide authority to support the contention that Bahtuoh’s
attorney acted reasonably. For these and the above-mentioned rea-
sons, there are compelling arguments that the state court unreasona-
bly applied the Strickland standard. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit
should have remanded the case.
Instead of carefully considering whether the attorney’s conduct fell
below the objective standard of reasonableness, the Eighth Circuit re-
lied heavily on the deferential standard of review. It repeated the
state court’s rationale and explained that the “unexpected develop-
ments” at trial justified the attorney’s decision to break his opening
statement promise.241 The Eighth Circuit indicated that there was
“record support for its conclusion that the extent of the weaknesses in
the state’s case was unforeseen to defense counsel.”242
But the court did not closely evaluate whether it was reasonable to
characterize the weakness in the state’s case as so “unexpected” that it
would justify such a dramatic shift in strategy. More significantly, it
did not thoroughly evaluate whether the attorney was reasonable in
“weigh[ing] the risks”243 of Bahtuoh’s failure to testify in light of the
attorney’s opening statement representation to the jury. Rather, it
simply “defer[red] to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s application of
the deficiency element in Strickland’s test under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
. . . .”
While the court was correct to exercise a degree of deference in ren-
dering its decision, it was incorrect to so freely accept the state court’s
determinations. This section has attempted to shine light on how the
attorney’s conduct was unreasonable when considered in the context
of Bahtuoh’s overall trial. It has also tried to uncover the analytical
gaps of the state court’s decision. By simply deferring to the state
court’s determinations, however, the Eighth Circuit left many of these
concerns unaddressed in its written opinion. This is cause for concern.
It casts doubt on the carefulness of the Eighth Circuit’s Bahtuoh deci-
sion and should cause one to question whether the court relied on def-
erence at the expense of analytical diligence.
240. Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 818.
241. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh III), 855 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2017).
242. Id. The court referred to the fact that when cross-examining one of the state’s
witnesses, the defense attorney “was able to establish that Parker had signaled
toward Bahtuoh, consistent with Bahtuoh’s grand jury testimony,” which “sug-
gested that Parker had no reason to fear Bahtuoh.” Id. It also referred to the
attorney’s closing statement, where he indicated that the jury heard Bahtuoh’s
grand jury testimony, “which he gave under oath . . . .” Id.
243. Id. at 873–74.
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B. Application of Strickland: The Second Prong
When a defendant is able to overcome the stringent requirements
of the first prong—proving that an attorney fell below the objective
standard of reasonableness—the defendant must still persuade the
court that but for the attorney’s conduct, the outcome of the trial
would probably have been different.244 To satisfy the second prong of
the Strickland standard, there must have been a reasonable
probability that, given the totality of the circumstances, the decision
to change strategy affected the outcome of the trial.245 As noted by the
Strickland Court, “[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the
errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.
Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test
. . . .”246 In this case, counsel’s decision likely had a forceful impact on
the jury’s verdict.
Admittedly, making a determination about prejudice is exceedingly
difficult because of the issue of “hindsight blindness.”247 The Strick-
land Court stated that hindsight bias should be avoided in making
determinations about prejudice, which means that the trial result can-
not be used to infer prejudice.248 However, as one scholar explains,
“Strickland’s prejudice prong requires the court to determine whether
incompetent counsel mattered, but hindsight blindness hampers its
ability to do so and almost always leads to affirmance.”249 Neverthe-
less, even if hindsight blindness can make it difficult to assess
whether prejudice resulted, that does not justify a court merely defer-
ring to the lower court’s judgment on the issue of prejudice.250 Such
244. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
245. Id. at 695.
246. Id. at 693.
247. Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Adjudication, Error Correction, and Hindsight Blind
Spots, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 189 (2016).
248. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to recon-
struct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the con-
duct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”). The Minnesota Supreme Court
specifically stated that hindsight bias should not be used. State v. Bahtuoh (Bah-
tuoh I), 840 N.W.2d 804, 817 (Minn. 2013) (citing State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224,
236 (Minn. 1986)). However, it is curious that both the Strickland court and the
court in Bahtuoh I cautioned against using the benefit of hindsight bias for prov-
ing deficiency in conduct when the court in Bahtuoh III seemed to use hindsight
bias to prove counsel’s conduct was reasonable. See Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 870
(explaining that counsel’s belief that the prosecution’s case was weak “proved
only partially correct” because Bahtuoh was not convicted of “first degree pre-
meditated murder”).
249. Griffin, supra note 247 (emphasis supplied).
250. Again, the Eighth Circuit declined to analyze Bahtuoh’s attorney’s conduct under
the prejudice prong. Bahtuoh III, 855 F.3d at 873.
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deference arguably elevates the Strickland standard from difficult to
nearly impossible to overcome.251
It is reasonable to conclude that the defense attorney’s so-called
strategy shift altered the outcome of the trial. Specifically, opening
statement promises can raise a jury’s expectations and foster skepti-
cism when those expectations fail to be satisfied.252 As explained by
the court in Ouber,
When a jury is promised that it will hear the defendant’s story from the defen-
dant’s own lips, and the defendant then reneges, common sense suggests that
the course of trial may be profoundly altered. A broken promise of this magni-
tude taints both the lawyer who vouchsafed it and the client on whose behalf
it was made.253
This effect is likely magnified by the fact that juries are more likely to
remember the first and last portions of the trial.254 As such, it is sensi-
ble to conclude that the jury harbored some degree of mistrust to-
wards Bahtuoh’s attorney for breaking his opening statement
promise. Further, it is reasonable to suggest that Bahtuoh’s attorney
drew negative attention to this broken promise by highlighting Bah-
tuoh’s failure to testify during closing arguments.255 For these rea-
sons, the jury’s opinion could easily have been altered against the
defendant when, after being promised this testimony, the defendant
failed to testify and profess his innocence.256
251. See Duncan, supra note 43, at 1700 (“[T]he science of predicting how any given
proceeding would have turned out if things had gone differently is inexact at best.
Thus, requiring a petitioner to prove that his proceeding would have been differ-
ent is to require him to prove what is, in most cases, not provable.”).
252. See Williams v. Woodford, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1164 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
253. Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2002); see Williams, 859 F. Supp. 2d
at 1167 (“A promise in the opening statement that a witness will testify in a
certain way is a pact between counsel and jury: He commits to present certain
proof in exchange for the jury’s implicit promise to keep an open mind until he
has an opportunity to do so. Jurors take such commitments seriously and feel
betrayed when the promise goes unfulfilled . . . .”); see also United States ex rel.
Hampton v. Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 259 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Promising a particular
type of testimony creates an expectation in the minds of jurors, and when defense
counsel without explanation fails to keep that promise, the jury may well infer
that the testimony would have been adverse to his client and may also question
the attorney’s credibility.”). Of course, the preceding statement from the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals is not exactly on point here because the attorney in Bah-
tuoh’s case attempted to justify his broken promise to the jury. But again, this
Note questions the reasonableness of these justifications—just as it suspects a
juror might.
254. Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion
Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C. L. REV. 481, 496 (1987).
255. State v. Bahtuoh (Bahtuoh I), 840 N.W.2d 804, 817 (Minn. 2013) (“Mr. Bahtuoh
did not take the stand. I told you he would. That’s my fault. However, why should
I put him on the stand?”); see also Cox & Bloom, supra note 2, at 268 (“Relating
the opening to the closing is warranted when you’ve complied with the contract
you made with the jury in opening your case.”).
256. Williams, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
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On the other hand, it is plausible that Bahtuoh was not prejudiced
by the decision to not testify. The jury heard the crux of Bahtuoh’s
testimony through the introduction of his grand-jury testimony.257
Further, unlike Ouber, the defense in Bahtuoh I did not entirely
center on Bahtuoh’s testimony.258 Moreover, the jury was given an
instruction not to hold Bahtuoh’s silence against him.259 Neverthe-
less, even if jury members believe they are evaluating a case objec-
tively, they are often driven by unconscious, extra-legal inferences.260
As explained by one scholar,
All of us possess some unreliable knowledge structures. These preconceptions
tend to make us resist conflicting evidence and accept confirming evidence,
coloring the manner in which we interpret everything in between. In addition,
we may apply these preconceptions unconsciously, misleading ourselves into
believing that we are evaluating data objectively. Courtroom style affects jury
decisionmaking through the operation of one or more knowledge structures.
Those knowledge structures might be . . . resistant to conflicting empirical
evidence and judicial instructions indicating that this link is unreliable.261
As such, the fact that a jury heard Bahtuoh’s grand jury testimony
may have been irrelevant once it realized Bahtuoh would no longer
testify at trial. If juries may unconsciously draw negative inferences
from how an attorney presents a case,262 and juries already harbor an
inherent belief that a defendant’s failure to testify is suspicious,263
then it is logical the attorney’s decision affected the jury, despite the
presence of other evidence presented against Bahtuoh.
For the above-mentioned reasons, it is more than conceivable that
Bahtuoh’s attorney prejudiced his client by reneging on his opening
statement promises. In light of this possibility, the analysis of the
Minnesota Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
would have been well-served by considering whether Bahtuoh was
prejudiced. Instead, both courts stopped analyzing after considering
the first part of the Strickland standard.264 Of course, analyzing both
prongs was not technically necessary after the courts dispensed with
the first prong. But the strong possibility of prejudice in this case
257. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh III), 855 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2017).
258. Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 818.
259. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh II), No. 14-CV-5009, 2016 WL 2727465, at *17 (D.
Minn. Apr. 12, 2016).
260. Gold, supra note 254, at 491.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Williams v. Woodford, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1164 (E.D. Cal. 2012); see also
Madrigal v. Yates, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“The jury could
have surmised that the reason for Petitioner’s failure to testify, after his trial
attorney promised he would, was that [the attorney] had realized, at some point
during trial, that Petitioner was not a credible witness or, even worse, that he
would commit perjury if allowed to take the stand.”).
264. Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh III), 855 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2017); State v. Bah-
tuoh (Bahtuoh I), 840 N.W.2d 804, 818 (Minn. 2013).
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should have still influenced the courts’ analysis. Specifically, the po-
tential prejudice in this case should have prompted the courts to take
a harder look at the reasonableness prong.
C. The Future of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims in
the Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Bahtuoh foreshadows a concerning
future for ineffective assistance of counsel claims and what passes for
reasonable professional judgment. First, Bahtuoh reflects a troubling
future for how federal courts might apply deferential standards of re-
view. Under current law, courts are correct to exercise some deference
when reviewing habeas petitions based upon claims of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. Failure to exercise deference would contravene
precedent and explicit statutory standards. But this does not mean
that federal courts should rely on deference to the detriment of analyt-
ical diligence. When courts rely too heavily on deferential standards of
review, they run the risk of (1) not carefully analyzing the record
before them, or (2) having their judgment clouded by this deference in
situations where an attorney’s conduct is truly deficient and
prejudicial.
Courts do not have to fall into this deference trap. The First Cir-
cuit’s Ouber decision provides a hopeful example of how a federal court
can faithfully apply these deferential standards without sacrificing
necessary analytical legwork. In Ouber, the court carefully reviewed
the attorney’s conduct in context of the overall trial to determine
whether the Strickland prongs were satisfied.265 It also assessed
whether the state court’s conclusion was sensible in light of the overall
record.266 In so doing, the First Circuit did not simply accept the state
court’s assertions and conclusions; it assessed whether those asser-
tions were supported by the record and whether its conclusions were
reasonable. Ouber thus demonstrates how a court can correctly apply
these deferential standards of review while also preserving analytical
rigor. Unfortunately, the Bahtuoh decision seems to signal a turn in
the other direction.
Moreover, the Bahtuoh decision also seems to reflect a judicial sys-
tem that defers to lawyers first and safeguards a defendant’s interests
second. Admittedly, the Strickland Court noted that “the purpose of
the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to
improve the quality of legal representation . . . . The purpose is simply
265. Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 31 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing O’Brien v. Dubois, 145
F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Because the state-court’s characterization is not
borne out by any plausible reading of the record, we deem it unreasonable.”).
266. Id. (“Since neither the state court’s opinion nor our own careful perscrutation of
the record reveals an objectively reasonable ground for the state court’s ‘no
prejudice’ determination, we are constrained to set it aside.”).
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to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”267 However,
this statement should not be construed to mean a defendant should
receive the lowest standard of legal representation. Such a construc-
tion would mean that defendants must endure the most extreme ex-
ample of low-quality representation to succeed on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.268 At the very least, this calls into ques-
tion whether courts are properly safeguarding a criminal defendant’s
right to receive a fair trial.
Importantly, the Bahtuoh decision also raises some concerns about
what passes muster as reasonable professional judgment under the
Strickland standard. As of now, the standard’s presumption of reason-
ableness seems to be justifying a lower standard of legal representa-
tion.269 Bahtuoh is one case that highlights the current low threshold
for what passes as reasonable professional conduct, but it is not the
only example. Even an attorney who has fallen asleep during a small
portion of trial is not “objectively unreasonable” as long as the attor-
ney was not asleep for substantial portions of the trial.270 But Bah-
tuoh is unique because it reveals how this overly flexible standard
might enable attorneys to absolve themselves of unsound judgment
calls by framing them as “strategy shifts.”271 As explained by one
scholar,
Much less than mediocre assistance passes muster under the Strickland stan-
dard. Errors in judgment and other mistakes may readily be characterized as
“strategy” or “tactics” and thus are beyond review. Indeed, courts employ a
lesser standard for judging the competence of lawyers in a capital case than
the standard for malpractice for doctors, accountants, and architects.272
Unfortunately, at the same time that the standard for effective as-
sistance of counsel is being loosened, there remains an imbalance in
power between defendants—especially indigent defendants—and the
state.273 As explained by one scholar,
267. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
268. This worry can become even more apparent in situations where an attorney is
inebriated or sleeping at trial. As explained by one scholar, “[T]he community
should not have confidence in a legal system where men and women are sent to
prison or executed when their attorneys slept during a key portion of the trial or
when their attorneys were legally intoxicated during a critical portion of the
trial.” Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drinks, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Require-
ment, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 475 (1996).
269. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
270. See, e.g., Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 625–26 (6th Cir. 2011).
271. Cf. Zelnick, supra note 10, at 388 (“The power of the attorney to override his
client’s wishes is virtually absolute whenever the decision can reasonably be clas-
sified as ‘trial strategy.’ Moreover, courts do not hesitate in labeling a decision as
trial strategy even when the decision is plainly linked to fundamental rights.”).
272. Id. at 379 (quoting Bright, supra note 15, at 1858).
273. Nilsen, supra note 195, at 20.
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The balance of power in the criminal justice system is strongly tilted toward
the state because of the resources available to the prosecution, including, most
significantly, those of the police. A further imbalance is created by the ex-
traordinary discretion the prosecution has regarding who to arrest, what to
charge, and what evidence to present.274
Thus, while defendants face an uphill battle against the state, the
Strickland standard entitles them to protection of the bare minimum
of legal representation.275
When the Court rendered its decision in Strickland, it was con-
cerned with creating too strict of standards.276 The Court feared that
a strict standard would stymie the ability for counsel to do their
job.277 As previously mentioned, imposing too regimented of guide-
lines may create a disincentive for attorneys to take appointments for
representing clients.278 However, if the courts reach a point where
any decision an attorney makes can be branded as a strategy shift—
such as in the Bahtuoh case—it justifies a criminal justice system
that, rather than operating to protect a defendant’s presumption of
innocence, is operating to protect its attorneys.279 In a profession de-
signed to serve its clients and foster justice, lowering the threshold for
effective assistance of counsel is arguably more detrimental to the
criminal justice system than heightening its standards.
For the foregoing reasons, the standard for effective assistance of
counsel should be strictly guarded. Given that lawyers are “trained in
the art of persuasion,”280 it is logical that an attorney may attempt to
absolve her errors and missteps by branding them as strategic deci-
274. Id.; see also Duncan, supra note 43, at 1701–02 (explaining the existence of a
“discernable gap” between defense counsel and counsel for the State).
275. As explained by one scholar, “While a criminal trial is not a game in which the
participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither
should our courts be respected while they continue to validate trials in which
essentially unarmed prisoners are sacrificed to gladiators.” Duncan supra note
43, at 1701.
276. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 690. Further, restrictive state budgets can also make it difficult to ensure
heightened standards for defense attorneys. As explained by one scholar, “states
have underfunded the defense to the point that lawyers labor under crippling
workloads, where triage is necessary in deciding which cases to aggressively de-
fend, and vigorous representation is available only to those who can afford it and
some lucky subset of indigent defendants.” Richard E. Meyers II, The Future of
Effective Assistance of Counsel: Rereading Cronic and Strickland in Light of Pa-
dilla, Frye, and Lafler, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 229, 233 (2012).
279. As explained by one scholar, “[N]either judicial economy nor an overly solicitous
attitude toward the psyche of defense attorneys justify diluting a right that is a
cornerstone of our adversarial system of justice.” Martin C. Calhoun, How to
Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 427 (1988).
280. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 776 (1993).
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sions.281 While attorneys are not expected to be perfect, they should
not be given carte blanche to haphazardly make trial moves without
considering the implications of these decisions on their respective cli-
ents. Thus, even if the Strickland standard includes a strong pre-
sumption of reasonableness, the attorney’s conduct must still meet the
threshold of reasonability. To meet this threshold in a case where an
attorney reneges on opening statement promises, the attorney should
be able to “identify any benefit to be derived from such a decisional
sequence” so the court can “see the combination as part and parcel of a
reasoned strategy.”282 Holding attorneys to this minimum standard of
reasonableness is necessary to protect defendants from lawyers mak-
ing erroneous decisions during trial and later branding these decisions
as strategy shifts.
In sum, when federal courts are reviewing habeas petitions for in-
effective assistance of counsel, exercising too much deference may re-
sult in condoning egregious errors by counsel. The detrimental impact
that these errors can have on criminal defendants should not be over-
looked. As noted by the Strickland Court, “The Sixth Amendment rec-
ognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions
counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial
system to produce just results.”283 If the Sixth Amendment is to have
meaning in the criminal justice system, then it is vital that defendants
are adequately represented.
V. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Bahtuoh v. Smith created a split in
the federal circuits. As of now, for the Eighth Circuit it is not necessa-
rily ineffective assistance of counsel for a defense attorney to break
opening statement promises to have a defendant testify. The Eighth
Circuit’s decision reaffirms the Strickland standard’s strong presump-
tion of reasonableness. It also affirms that federal courts must exer-
cise a degree of deference to state court determinations when
reviewing claims that arise on habeas petitions. In the process, how-
ever, the Eighth Circuit has arguably gone too far in relying on the
doubly deferential approach to state court decisions on habeas review.
This Note argued that in the absence of such an overly deferential
standard, the court could have reasonably reached a different result.
This Note further expressed concern that the Bahtuoh decision may
have negative future implications for criminal defendants. If a point is
reached where all errors may be sanctioned as strategy shifts, and fed-
281. Zelnick, supra note 10, at 388.
282. Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2002).
283. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
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eral courts are overly relying on deferential standards of review to
conduct their analyses, the safeguards to one’s Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel may begin to fade.
